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Abstract:  This paper provides additional international evidence on the IPOs by 
examining the initial performance and two main determinants of short-run underpricing 
of 169 IPOs listed on the Athens Stock Exchange (ASE) over the period 1997-2002. 
The initial performance of the IPOs is measured by calculated two formulas: the raw 
returns and the excess or adjusted returns of the first, fifth and twenty first day 
respectively. Furthermore, we use a proxy to rank the underwriters’ prestige along with 
the times of oversubscription, which are introduced as explanatory variables in our 
model. The results of the analysis provide evidence of significant underpricing. 
Furthermore, the cross sectional analysis on the determinants of the IPOs shows that 
both the underwriters’ prestige and the times of oversubscription significantly affect the 
underpricing level of the IPOs over the most important and “hot” period for the Greek 
emerging stock market since its establishment, in terms of growth rates, acceleration of 
the going public process and volatility of market and stock returns. 
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I. Introduction 
In this study it is analysed one of the asset market anomalies, the underpricing of initial 
public offerings (IPOs) of new shares. This is a very interesting topic because it has 
always been a mystery why the IPOs are priced in a manner that results in such large 
positive average initial returns. When a firm issues a public traded equity for the first 
time it follows different patterns of share price fluctuations. Such anomalous price 
behaviour violates the Efficient Market Hypothesis (EMH) and on average leads to 
arbitrage profits for those who have an advantage in gaining information.  
Numerous researches have been carried out to theorise the empirical findings 
and thus challenges us to construct a framework of the hypotheses formulated to explain 
the underpricing phenomenon as a conceptual groundwork for the present study. All 
these hypotheses emerged from the finance literature are based on the uncertainty 
inherent in the IPO process and have their limitations. Having discussed the basic 
framework, we move on to provide empirical evidence using the population of the IPOs 
of the Athens Stock Exchange (ASE) during the period 1997-2002.  
The primary purpose of this paper is to reveal the existence and magnitude of 
short-run underpricing over the most important and “hot” period for the ASE since its 
establishment. Moreover, this study aims to provide an insight primarily into the 
hypothesis of prestigious underwriters and the relationship between oversubscription 
and underpricing as well, using a proxy to rank the underwriter’s prestige along with the 
times of oversubscription which are introduced as the explanatory variables in our 
model.  
This is of particular interest for three reasons. First, the limited existed research 
on the Greek IPO market concentrated only to the degree of the underpricing not 
providing any explanation of this phenomenon. Second, this investigation has been 
applied mainly on developed and Far East Asia markets, in contrast to emerging 
markets as in the case of the ASE during the examined period. Third, the 
oversubscription level of the IPOs and the underwriting facilities have grown 
significantly, especially during the period 1997-2000 in which the ASE has witnessed a 
boom and both the number of new IPOs and the total amount sought to be raised have 
increased rapidly. Beatty and Ritter’s (1986) inverse relationship between the reputation 
of the lead underwriter of an IPO and the IPO’s return will be exemplified and then we   3
show that both these explanatory variables are the main determinants of the excess 
returns of the new public offerings.  
The remainder of the article is structured as follows: Section II presents the 
international experience according to the main studies on the initial performance of 
IPOs in Greece and selected European and international markets. Section III provides a 
brief literature review regarding the fundamental hypotheses that have been developed 
in order to provide the reasons for underpricing. Section IV reports the research data 
and the methodology followed. Section V provides the empirical results and finally, we 
offer our concluding comments in Section VI. 
II. International Evidence 
In the short-run, the process of going public is highly correlated with large initial returns 
to investors who obtain IPOs of common stock. Several studies show that initial 
underpricing is usual in every stock market across the world. Table I provides a 
summary of the main studies on the performance of the IPOs in Greece and selected 
European and international markets.  
Underpricing varies from 5.4% in Canada to 388% in China. In the case of 
Greece, the existing literature on the performance of IPOs is limited. For example, 
Kazantzis and Levis (1995) investigate the IPOs in Greece using a sample of 79 firms 
going public between 1987 and 1991. Their results show that Greek IPOs are on 
average underpriced by 48.5%. Kazantzis and Thomas (1996) find that the mean first 
day raw and adjusted return for the Greek IPOs are 50.89% and 51.73% respectively 
during the period 1987-1994. Also, Kollintzas et al. (1996) report an average initial 
adjusted return of 26.3% during the period 1972-1994.  
take in Table I 
Generally, from the empirical results of Table I it seems that the underpricing is 
not affected by the political environment and the magnitude of this phenomenon is 
relatively higher for the emerging markets than the other financial markets.  
Although in the short run the performance of IPOs is highly correlated with 
abnormal positive returns, this seems not to hold in the long run. For example, Ritter 
(1991) examined the market behaviour of new firms in the U.S. over three years after 
going public. He found that the shares of these firms significantly underperformed in 
the long run.    4
III. Literature Review 
The underpricing of the initial public offerings has challenged numerous researchers to 
explain this phenomenon. The hypotheses that have been developed on this subject and 
emerged from the finance literature form a framework which analyse the reasons for 
underpricing. These explanations stem from the large amount of uncertainty and the 
information asymmetry among the issuer, the underwriter and the investors. The 
fundamental hypotheses which deal with the explanation of this phenomenon are briefly 
reviewed below. 
 
i. Monopsony Power of Underwriter Hypothesis. Under the assumption of perfect or 
symmetric information, Ritter (1984) argues that the investment bankers take advantage 
of their superior knowledge of market conditions to underprice the offerings to 
maximise their revenues. 
ii. Winner’s Curse Hypothesis. Rock (1986) argues that the uniformed investors face 
the winners curse since only ex-post can observe if the offering in which they 
participated was a “lemon” or not. Therefore, under the condition of asymmetry 
between informed and uninformed investors, IPO returns are required by uninformed 
investors as compensation for the risk of trading against superior information.  
iii. Hypothesis of Prestigious Underwriters. Under the condition of asymmetric 
information between issuers and investors, Beatty and Ritter (1986) argue that the 
underwriters care about their reputation and therefore do not underpricing too much the 
IPOs. Also, Carter and Manaster (1990) argue that the underwriters have an advantage 
in information and therefore undertake only high quality offerings in order to build their 
reputation and to maintain their high prestige. Carter et al. (1998) examine the effect of 
underwriter’s reputation on the degree of underpricing and support Beatty and Ritter’s 
hypothesis. Following the same line, Booth and Smith (1986) underpinning the role of 
underwriters in the capital raising process through the certification hypothesis.  
iv. Lawsuit Avoidance Hypothesis. Under the condition of symmetric information, 
Tinic (1988) argues that underpricing is one way of reducing the frequency and the cost 
of future lawsuits. However, Drake and Vetsuypens (1993) criticize and reject this 
hypothesis. 
v. Signalling Hypothesis. According to Allen and Faulhaber (1989) and Grinblatt 
and Huang, (1989), into the framework of asymmetric information, the underpriced new   5
issues “leave a good taste” to investors, allowing the firms and insiders to sell future 
offerings at a higher price than otherwise would be the case.  
vi. Market Feedback Hypothesis.  According to Benviste and Spindt (1989) and 
Jegadeesh et al. (1993), under the condition of asymmetric information between 
underwriters and investors, the underwriters underprice the IPOs to induce regular 
investors to reveal information during the pre-selling period and through the book 
building process underwriters obtain valuable information which assists them to re-price 
the new issue. 
vii. Market Bandwagon Hypothesis. Welch (1992) argues that the potential investors 
not only pay attention to their own information about the new issue but also to whether 
other investors are purchasing. This ration may develop bandwagon effects. The 
underwriter will underprice the new issue in order to attract the first few potential 
investors to buy and induce a bandwagon in which all subsequent investors want to buy 
irrespective of their own information. 
viii. Ownership Dispersion or Control Hypothesis.  Brennan and Franks (1997) 
argue that the underpricing of the issue could reduce the risks of a hostile takeover since 
it will lead to oversubscription, generating on the one hand an increased liquidity of the 
market for the stock and on the other hand a large number of small shareholders. 
The overwhelming majority of empirical studies assume asymmetric information 
because the results are more plausible and the majority of these hypotheses are 
supported by empirical findings. However, it should be stressed that some of the above 
hypotheses which are merely based on strong assumptions might be unfeasible. 
Generally, most underpricing explanations seem to be well grounded but care must be 
taken when dealing with such market anomalies. 
 
IV. Research Data and Methodology 
Our sample consists of 169 IPOs launched on the ASE from 1/1/1997 to 31/12/2002, 
which is actually the population of public offerings of this period. The sample included 
only listings of common stocks, while preference stocks as well as transfers from the 
one market to another are not examined here. The main sources of the construction of 
IPOs database are the Annual Reports of Hellenic Capital Market Commission and the 
Annual and Monthly Statistical Bulletin of ASE. All closing prices were adjusted for 
dividends, stock splits and any other capital changes.    6
  All data concerned the IPOs of common stock of Main, Parallel and New Stock 
Exchange Market of the Athens Stock Exchange. Table II exhibits the distribution of 
the IPOs launched on the ASE by year, market and totally during the period 1997-2002. 
The year 2000 was the year with the biggest number of listings in the ASE (48 IPOs), 
while the second year with the most new listings was 1999 (42 IPOs). Furthermore, we 
should point out that the annual distribution of the new issues of common stocks 
became according to the time period of public offerings and not according to the first 
day of entrance of a firm in the ASE for consistency with previous relative studies. 
take in Table II 
Table III exhibits the value of transactions, the market capitalization, the capital 
raised through IPOs and the percent change of ASE General Index for the period 1997 
to 2002. This six- year period is characterized as extremely important for the ASE. 
During the period 1997-1999, all the growth figures of the ASE displayed a remarkable 
increase due to the massive entrance of individual and institutional investors in the 
capital market. However, the Greek capital market exhibited a severe underperformance 
from 2000 to 2002 that has been largely resulted on the previous overly optimistic 
climate about the firms’ prospects and the experienced speculative process.  
take in Table III 
IV.1 Initial Performance of IPOs 
The initial performance of the IPOs is estimated by calculated two formulas widely used 
in international empirical studies: the raw returns and the excess or adjusted returns. 
The raw returns are those that compare the price of the share(i) at the time l and 
at time x, where  ) ( l − x  is the number of the days between the last day of the offering 
and the first trading day of the share. Based on the price of each IPOi (P0) we estimate 
the following initial returns on the closing price of the 1st day (P1), the 5th day-a week 
later (P5), and the 21st day -a month later (P21). The formula for the raw returns 
(underpricing) of the first day for each IPO is defined as: 
100
Price   IPO   The
   ) Price   IPO   (The - day)   P    the of   price   (Closing
i ,
i , x × =
l
l UP ,     (1) 
where x=1, 5, 21 , and l,i  = the last day of the public offering of the firm i. Working 
the same way using as base the IPO price, we estimate the raw returns for the 5th and 
21st day as well.   7
Following the same formula used to estimate the raw return of the IPO we use 
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The estimation of excess return combines the returns of the shares with the 
fluctuations of the market. It is estimated as the difference between the raw return of the 
IPO for the specified time interval minus the return of the market General Index for the 
same time interval. This kind of evaluation will reveal whether the IPO over or under-
perform the market and is defined as: 
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l               (3) 
where x, , l i defined as above, P is the closing price of the security, and GI is the value 
of the General Index. 
It should be pointed out that the estimation of the excess returns is based on the 
last day of the offering of the IPOs and therefore we account for the same day for the 
Gen. Index of the ASE. The reason we use this time interval and not the first day of the 
offering of the IPO is for the benefit of the investors to register for IPOs on the last date 
of the offering because by doing so they minimise the time interval they have lock up 
their capital. 
IV.2 The Explanatory Variables and the Model  
We test the hypothesis that the more prestigious the underwriter, the higher his 
incentive to mitigate the underpricing of the IPO. Underwriters are identified by their 
reputation. In this study reputation is taken to be exogenous. Since there are no official 
rankings regarding of each underwriter’s prestige apart from the data of the 
corresponding jobs they carried out during the examined time period, and as in the 
relevant bibliography such a ranking comes ad-hoc according to the data of each 
researcher, we use as proxy for the underwriter the ratio of capital he has risen from 
1997 to 2002 and we assign this value to each corresponding firm. Therefore, we define 
the value of each underwriter as the relative capital raised (CR) over the total amount of 







prestige                                                    (4) 
where CRj is the capital raised by each underwriter j and i is the firm that went public. 
What we get varies between zero and one. The higher value of underwriter is 
0.244 and the lower is 0.007. We regard as prestigious those underwriters whose 
prestige ratio is above 0.04. 
Regarding the actual testing of the hypothesis, a dummy is included to capture 
the underwriter’s effect. Therefore, we assign D=1 for prestigious and D=0 for non -
prestigious underwriters.  
It only remains to check in algebraic terms what our assumption predicts. For 
instance, if D=1 (stands for prestigious), the theory predicts a negative coefficient on the 
dummy since regressing at the excess returns of the first day price, a negative 
coefficient on the dummy underwriter would imply that this distance will always be 
smaller and closer to the price at the end of the first trading day (less underpricing). 
Conversely, when the dummy takes the value zero (a non-prestigious underwriter) then 
the distance will be greater (more underpricing). 
Extending our analysis, we include the times of oversubscription as an 
explanatory variable since it is highly positively correlated with the excess returns of the 
first day. In Table IV, we show the correlation between the times of oversubscription 
and the first day adjusted returns of the IPOs. This highly positive relationship between 
these two variables means that the greatest part of the oversubscription of a public 
offering implies a strong interest from the side of investors for each firm. 
take in Table IV 
The high level of significance of oversubscription may also explain the 
underpricing under the assumption that there is an information leakage during the public 
offering (Chowdhry and Sherman, 1996). Table V reports the mean, maximum and 
minimum values of the times of oversubscription of the IPOs launched in ASE by year 
and for the entire examined period. Such oversubscription levels with mean of 89.96 
times during the period 1997-2002 indicate that even uninformed investors are able to 
correctly “guess” that the offer price was too low and therefore they could create a 
bandwagon effect. 
take in Table V   9
Having defined the variables, we now proceed to the model formulated in this 
study. Using the excess returns (ERx,i) of the IPOi as the dependent variable and as 
explanatory variables the dummy variable for the prestigious underwriter and the 
underwriter (UNDWRi) and the times of oversubscription (OS), the following formula 
is estimated:  
) ( ) ( ) (
* * , 3 2 1 1 ,
+ + −
+ + + + = i x i i i i x e OS b UNDWR b Dummy b a ER
            (5) 
where ex,i is the residual of the regression.  
For all the regressions the OLS method is used. Furthermore, because cross 
sectional data and regression equations are used, there are heteroscedasticity problems 
in the residuals. Therefore, the adjusted White’s heteroskedasticity-consistent estimates 
are employed for all the regressions we do. 
 
V. Empirical Results 
In this section, we present the results of the analyses carried out in two stages. In the 
first stage, the empirical findings of the analysis on the initial performance of the IPOs 
are presented. In the second stage, the results of the cross sectional analysis on the 
influence of both the underwriter’s prestige and the oversubscription to the underpricing 
level of the IPOs are provided. 
 
V.1 IPO Returns 
In Table VI, we present the results from the average raw and excess returns of IPOs 
concerning the whole sample of new stock issues took place in ASE during the period 
1997-2002.  
take in Table VI 
The average raw return of the first day is 52.7%, while the average adjusted 
return is 54.28%. The average raw return of the fifth and the twenty first day is 44.78% 
and 41.84% respectively, while the average excess return is 45.32% and 43.83% [1]. 
The results suggest that the new issues were on average underpriced since it had 
significant returns for those who had participated in the offering and sold the new shares 
at the closing of the first, fifth and twenty first day respectively.  
   10
V.2 Determinants of IPO Returns 
Table VII provides the results concerning the explanatory variables (dummy for 
prestigious underwriters, prestige ratio of underwriters and times of oversubscription) of 
the underpricing phenomenon in ASE during the period 1997-2002. The signs of the 
explanatory variables are in line with the theory and also are statistically significant 
different from zero at 5% and 1% level respectively. 
The fit of the line 0.697 is satisfactory since we are dealing with cross sectional 
data. It is important to emphasize that the dummy coefficient (the prestigious 
underwriters) is statistically significant different from zero at 10% level of significance 
and the sign of it is negative. Whether the underwriter is prestigious or not has 
significant impact on the excess returns and therefore on the magnitude of underpricing. 
The dummy coefficient measures the average difference in the excess return between 
prestigious and non-prestigious underwriters. In our analysis, a prestigious underwriter 
is estimated to result in a 28.58 units reduction in the average excess return.  
This finding supports the Beatty and Ritter’s hypothesis of prestigious 
underwriters; our model predicts that the initial excess return on the IPO is negatively 
correlated with the underwriter’s reputation. It is clear that the prestigious underwriter 
cares about his reputation and therefore he does have an incentive not only to avoid 
extreme underpricing but to underprice enough to achieve a successful public offering 
which will not damage his reputation and will satisfy the issuer as well leaving less 
money on the table for the flippers. This is contrary to the view of Cooney et al. (1999) 
who suggest that initial returns for a specific class of IPOs are positively related to the 
prestige of the underwriter in the nineties.  
Finally, the coefficient of oversubscription is statistically different from zero at 
1% level of significance providing thus significant explanatory power to the variable. In 
all the regressions undertaken, the coefficient of oversubscription was always 
statistically significant different from zero.  
take in Table VII 
VI. Concluding Comments 
The underpricing of IPOs of stocks is recognized as one of the anomalies that 
challenges the Efficient Markets Hypothesis. This paper analysed the phenomenon of 
the underpricing of IPOs and its main determinants for the ASE, having as groundwork   11
the classification of the relative theories of underpricing. A large number of studies on 
the performance of IPOs suggests that underpricing exists in every stock market and 
also that on average investors purchasing IPOs at the launch price earn abnormal returns 
at the end of the first trading day. 
Cross sectional data of 169 firms listed and traded on the ASE during the period 
1997-2002 provide empirical evidence of the underpricing of IPOs. The first day 
adjusted return is 54.28% higher from any previous study for the ASE. Regarding the 
magnitude of underpricing, the results show, on average, an initial underpricing of 
52.7% at the end of the first day, 44.78% at the end of the fifth day and 41.84% at the 
end of the first month. These results are highly significant and in line with the results of 
other international studies on emerging IPO markets. The downward trend in both raw 
and excess returns reported in this study is consistent with the findings of Kollintzas et 
al. (1996) and Kazantzis and Thomas (1996), who provide evidence that the rate of 
growing on the returns of investors is diminishing.  
Moreover, we test the Beatty and Ritter’s (1986) hypothesis of the prestigious 
underwriter and the relationship between underpricing and oversubscription. The results 
on the prestigious underwriter are in line with Beatty and Ritter’s hypothesis, where the 
dummy variable used is significant and mitigates the magnitude of the phenomenon. 
Also, the variable of the power of oversubscription appears to be highly significant and 
under the assumption of leakage of information provides significant explanation of the 
phenomenon. The oversubscription is a pure signal to the investors that the share is 
underpriced. When investors realise ex ante that the offer price is too low, a large 
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Endnotes 
 
[1] Setting as a criterion of comparison for IPOs returns the kind of market in which the 
new issues listed, we observe that the underpricing phenomenon follows the same 
patterns as in Table VI, but is more persistent in the Parallel and New Market of ASE 
than the Main Market. In the Main Market, the mean raw return of the first, fifth and 
twenty first day is 28.09%, 26.45% and 22.71% respectively, while in the Parallel 
Market is 61.19%, 59.37% and 54.82%. However, for the 5 IPOs in the New Stock 
Exchange Market the mean raw return of the first, fifth and twenty first day is 118.25%, 
114.42% and 111.67% respectively.     
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Table I: International Empirical Results of Underpricing 







Belgium  Rogiers et al. (1993)
a  1984-1999 69  15.7% 
Brazil Leal  (1998)  1979-1992  66  74.1% 
Canada  Jog and Srivastava
 a 1971-1992  258  5.4%
b 
China  Datar and Mao (1997)
 a 1990-1996  226  388%
 b 
Finland Keloharju  (1993)  1984-1992  85  9.6% 
France  Derrien and Womack (1999)  1992-1998  264  13.2% 
Germany   Ljunqvist (1999)  1978-1999  407  27.7% 
Greece  Kazantzis and Levis (1995)  







Hong Kong  Zao and Wu
 a   1980-1996  334  15.9%
 b 
Hungary  Jelic and Briston (1999)  1990-1998  25  44% 
Italy  Arosio, Guidici and Paleari 
(2000)  
1985-2000 164  23,9% 
Japan   Fukuda et al., Hamao et al.
 a 1970-1996  975  24%
 b 
Korea  Dhatt et al., Choi and Heo
 a 1980-1996 477  74.3%
 b 
Malaysia  Isa and Yong
 a 1980-1998  401  104.1% 
Portugal  Almeida and Dugue (2000)  1992-1998  21  10.5%
 b 
Singapore  Lee et al.
 a   1973-1992  128  31.4%
 b 
Spain  Otero and Fernandez (2000)  1985-1997  58  12.8%
 b 
Taiwan  Lin and Sheu
 a 1986-1995  241  34.6%
 b 
Turkey Durukan  (2002)  1990-1997  173  14.61%
  
U.K.  Loughran et al. (1994, upd. 
2000) 
1959-1999 2802  13.9% 
USA  Ibbotson et al.
 a 1960-1999  14376  17.4%
 b 
Source: Various studies cited 
a Cited in Loughran et al. (1994, updated 2000). 
b First day raw return   16
 
Table II: Distribution of IPOs by Year and Market During 1997 – 2002 
Year  Number of IPOs  Main Market  Parallel Market  New Stock Exchange 
Market 
1997 13  3  10  - 
1998 24  9  15  - 
1999 42  20  22  - 
2000 48  15  33  - 
2001 24  13  9  2 
2002 18  6  9  3 
Total  169  66                 98  5 
Source: Annual Reports of Hellenic Capital Market Commission and Annual & Monthly Statistical Bulletin 
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1997  17,081.4 - 28,793.3 -  29.6 47.1  59.0  -  58.5 
1998 41,708.1 144.2 67,024.8 132.8  63.6  100.1  1,157.2  1,861.4  85.1 
1999 173,027.0 314.9 197,537.0 194.7  169.4  172.8  1,840.0  59.0  102.2 
2000 101,675.7 -41.2 117,956.3 -40.3  95.5  92.5  2,557.8  39.01  -38.8 
2001 40,529.8 -60.1 96,949.5 -17.8  74.1  67.4  1,075.6  -137.8  -23.5 
2002 24,771.0 -38.9 65,759.7 -47.4  46.9  48.2  92.5  -1,062.8  -32.5 

































Table V: Times of Oversubscription of IPOs over the Period 1997-2002 









1997 13  32.83  111.4  1.2 
1998 24  105.11  337  1 
1999 42  235.43  780 1,4 
2000 48  116.48  753.5 1 
2001 24  12.28  68,2  0.325 
2002 18  19.64 85  0.7 
1997-2002 169  89.96  355,85  0.9375 












Times of Oversubscription (OS)  1  0.799 




























Min Return  Max Return 
 
Day 1  52.7% 1.013  169  -32.4%  463% 
Day 5  44.78% 1.02  169  -69.6%  518% 
Day 21  41.84% 0.939  169  -53.7%  608% 
Excess or Adjusted Returns 
Day 1  54.28% .997  169  -37%  465% 
Day 5  45.32% 1.004  169  -62%  519% 
Day 21  43.83% .938  169  -48%  615%   20
 
 







t- statistic  F-Statistic  Adj-R
2 
ER Constant  6.74  0.682     
   (10.38)      
 Dummy  (prestigious)  -28.58  -1.78*  33.61  0.697 
   (17.82)      
 UNDWR  2.092  2.069**     
   (1.073)      
 OS  0.502  7.94***     
   (0.071)      
* Significant at the 10% level 
** Significant at the 5% level 
*** Significant at the 1% level 
White’s heteroscedasticity consistent estimates. 
 
 